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Abstract
The Netflix original film Cuties sparked controversy and outrage on its
release, simultaneously prompting advocates of the film to celebrate it as a
creative success protected by the First Amendment, while generating immense
criticism from Senator Ted Cruz as well as a criminal indictment from a Texas
grand jury. Because of existing Supreme Court law, any criminal prosecution
against a digital media company could fail in one jurisdiction but be successful in
another, despite the fact that the film is available to subscribers throughout the
United States. This paper explores the application of the First Amendment to this
film and others like it, and explains why criminal prosecution of such media is
unfortunately and unnecessarily dependent upon the Supreme Court’s application
of the “local community standard.” This paper advocates for the complete
removal of the local community standards test from the Supreme Court’s
obscenity and child pornography jurisprudence.
This paper first provides a summary of obscenity law and its interwoven
connections to laws criminalizing child pornography. Second, this paper outlines
the key problems central to the Supreme Court’s obscenity jurisprudence,
demonstrating its analytical shortcomings, its ideological incongruency with the
founding philosophies of the Constitution, and its opposition to Biblical
principles. Finally, this paper highlights key solutions for solving the problems
with obscenity law and how to bring the doctrine back into compliance with
America’s founding principles and the operation of Biblical values.
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I.

Introduction

On January 23, 2020, Maïmouna Doucouré made her directorial debut
premiering the Netflix film Cuties (Mignonnes in its original French), a story that
depicts and allegedly combats the hyper-sexualization of pre-adolescent girls.1 The
film follows 11-year-old Amy as she turns away from a traditional Islamic life and
joins a dance troupe of other girls, all performing extended sequences of
provocative and suggestive dance moves. Under the proffered guise of art raising
awareness about the sexualization of pre-teen girls, the film inadvertently provides
publicly available content for persons who might derive deviant pleasure from the
film.
The First Amendment plays a central role in the public discussion
surrounding this debate. Proponents of the film invoke the protections of the First
Amendment to safe harbor their actions, with Netflix Co-CEO Ted Sarandos
claiming that the film has strong “First Amendment implications” and that those
who were attacking the film were trying to “censor storytelling.”2 Critics of the film
similarly claim that the First Amendment does not protect the actions depicted, with
Senator Ted Cruz calling on the Department of Justice to “investigate whether
Netflix… violated any federal laws against the production and distribution of child
pornography.”3
The film is clearly speech for purposes of the First Amendment and
therefore necessarily falls under its analysis. But what application does the First
Amendment guarantee of “free speech” have to such a film? Is the film considered
to be “obscene” or “child pornography” under Supreme Court or state law, such
that it would strip the film of First Amendment protection? A Texas grand jury
believes that it has the answers to these questions, indicting Netflix under a Texas
state statute, “Promotion of Lewd Visual Material Depicting a Child.”4 However,
this prosecution, as will be articulated in this paper, hangs on the application of a
localized standard that is dependent upon the community where the crime is being
charged. This means that even if this prosecution is successful in Texas, the
Supreme Court law is such that a similar prosecution against Netflix could fail in
David Rooney, “Cuties” (“Mignonnes”): Film Review | Sundance 2020 (The Hollywood
Reporter, 2020).
2
Jake Kanter, Netflix Chief Ted Sarandos Fires Back At “Cuties” Controversy: “It's Surprising In
2020 America That We're Having A Discussion About Censoring Storytelling” (Deadline, 2020).
3
Jason Murdock, Ted Cruz Calls for Justice Department to Investigate Netflix Over “Cuties”
Child Porn Claims (Newsweek, 2020).
4
Jolie McCullough and Stacy Fernandez, Texas politicians fueled criticism of “Cuties.” Now,
Netflix is facing criminal charges in a small East Texas county (The Texas Tribune, 2020).
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another jurisdiction, despite the film being available to subscribers throughout the
United States. Similarly, this means that Federal prosecutions, which also rely on
the application of a localized standard for obscenity, are nearly impossible to
effectuate against Netflix or other national entertainment establishment.
Furthermore, because child pornography can be legally attacked directly or
collaterally if the material is obscene, this means that efforts by state and federal
authorities to enforce child pornography laws face similar challenges, all because
of the local community standards prong of the Supreme Court’s obscenity test.
Therefore, to assist the state and federal prosecution of obscenity and child
pornography, this paper advocates for the complete removal of the local community
standards test from the Supreme Court’s obscenity and child pornography
jurisprudence.
To this end, this paper will outline the Supreme Court cases that interpret
this challenging area of the law, first providing a summary of obscenity law and its
related and interwoven connections to child pornography. Second, this paper will
outline the key problems central to the Supreme Court’s obscenity jurisprudence,
demonstrating its analytical shortcomings, ideological incongruency with the
founding philosophies of the Constitution, and its complete and total opposition to
Biblical principles. Finally, this paper will highlight key solutions for clarifying and
solving the problems with obscenity case law, bringing the doctrine back into
compliance with America’s founding principles and the operation of Biblical
values.
II.

Summary

A. Roth and the Formation of the Obscenity Test
The Supreme Court has an extensive compendium of cases involving
provisions of the First Amendment, including a complex history of dealing with
obscenity case law. This sector of Constitutional law is one of the most notoriously
confusing and challenging areas of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. Defining
what is obscene and articulating the appropriate judicial response to this complex
inquiry has been a taxing struggle for the High Court to manage, with one case
eliciting Justice Stewart’s famous remark of exasperation, “I know it when I see
it.”5
The Court’s most foundational examination into obscenity is Roth v. United
6
States. Roth was a New York businessman that would circulate advertisement
matter to solicit sales of his books.7 He was charged with violating a federal
5

Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1963) (Stewart, J. concurring).
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
7
Id. at 480.
6
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obscenity statute.8 The issue the Court looked to was “whether obscenity is
utterance within the area of protected speech and press.”9 First, the Court looked to
history to determine the breadth of the First Amendment.10 Examining the state of
the law in 1792, the Court noted that all 14 states that existed then “made either
blasphemy or profanity, or both, statutory crimes” and cited to a 1712
Massachusetts law that treated profanity and obscenity as “related offenses.”11
Furthermore, the Court cited a 1774 letter from the Continental Congress to the
inhabitants of Quebec, noting that the protections of the First Amendment were
“fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of
political and social changes desired by the people” and not for the promulgation of
profane or obscene materials.12 Ultimately, the Court held that looking at the history
of the Constitution, “there is sufficiently contemporaneous evidence to show that
obscenity, too, was outside the protection intended for speech and press.”13 The
Court went on to note that “implicit in the history of the First Amendment is the
rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance” and that this
principle sounded true in international law, throughout all states, in federal law, and
in accordance with Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.14 The Court definitively stated
that “obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or
press.”15
After this clear statement, the Roth Court then began a much less clear
analysis into what is now a perennial struggle: defining the meaning of the word
“obscenity.” The Court first noted what obscenity was not, noting that “sex and
obscenity are not synonymous” and that obscene material is that “which deals with
sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest.”16 The Court also rejected the Hicklin
standard that had been previously used by courts.17 After these analytical
roadblocks were navigated, the Roth Court ultimately defined obscenity as
“whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the
dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest.”18
This definition, albeit better than Hicklin or having no definition at all,
suffers from an immediate lack of clarity, potential vagueness problems, and
presents itself with a litany of latent interpretational issues. However, the Court
8

Id.
Id. at 481.
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Id. at 483.
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Id. at 484.
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Id.
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Id. at 484-85; See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
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Id. at 487.
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noted that despite its imprecise definition, “lack of precision is not itself offensive
to the requirements of due process.”19 In a moment of prophetic utterance, the Court
even heralded the possibility of “marginal cases in which it is difficult to determine
the side of the line on which a particular fact situation falls” but said that even this
was “not sufficient reason to hold the language too ambiguous.”20 Ultimately, the
Court affirmed the determinations of the lower court.21
B. Miller, Slaton, and Further Clarification Attempts
After Roth, there was a lack of consensus regarding how the area of
obscenity should be applied. The clearest restatement of Roth comes in the plurality
decision of Memoirs v. Massachusetts, where that Court restated Roth in three
elements:
“(a) the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to a
prurient interest in sex; (b) the material is patently offensive because it
affronts contemporary community standards relating to the description or
representation of sexual matters; and (c) the material is utterly without
redeeming social value.”22
As this area of law continued to develop from the High Court and in the
Circuits, two problems continued to emerge. First, the Court continued to struggle
with a precise articulation of the obscenity definition as set out in Roth. Plurality
opinions do not bind the Court and thus the lack of majority consensus continued
to stifle the clarification of obscenity law. Adding the phrase “utterly without
redeeming social important” from Memoirs muddied the waters and made it even
harder for courts to apply Roth’s already imprecise definition. Second, cases such
as Stanley v. Georgia held that states were barred from “making the private
possession of obscene material a crime.”23 Paradoxically, cases such as United
States v. Reidel held that simply because there was a right to possess obscene
materials did not mean that there was a right to obtain said obscene materials.24
Furthermore, the Court in Osborne v. Ohio said that child pornography was
explicitly excluded from the category of obscene materials that a person could
possess under Stanley.25 This created a system where adult pornography could be
19

Id. at 491.
Id. at 491-92.
21
Id. at 494.
22
Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966) (emphasis added).
23
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 560-64 (1969).
24
United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971).
25
Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990).
20
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possessed but not obtained, while child pornography could neither be possessed nor
obtained. The Court in Miller v. California and Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton
attempted to grant some clarity in these two areas.
In Miller, the Supreme Court undertook an effort to clarify the definition of
obscenity. In that case, the Petitioner had mailed unsolicited advertising brochures
that contained pictures and drawings explicitly depicting sexual activities.26 There
was a California statute that criminalized such activity and thus provided the
penalty against Miller.27 The issue the Court primarily looked at was how to “define
the standards which must be used to identify obscene material that a State may
regulate without infringing on the First Amendment.”28 The Court summarized the
controversy since Roth through Memoirs and beyond, ultimately noting that “no
Member of the Court today supports the Memoirs formulation.”29 Leaving the
Memoirs plurality standard behind, the Court next embarked on the process of
curating the definition of obscenity. The Court “confine[d] the permissible scope
of such regulation to works which depict or describe sexual conduct” and noted that
such conduct “must be specifically defined by the applicable state law.”30 The Court
ultimately laid out the following revised obscenity definition:
a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community
standards would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient
interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive
way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c)
whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political
or scientific value.”31
After the Court noted the problems in this area, it then began the journey of
“provid[ing] positive guidance to federal and state courts alike.”32 The Court states
that it should not “arbitrarily depriv[e] the States of a power reserved to them under
the Constitution.”33 However, the Court was unable to resolve the tension between
the ability of the Supreme Court to regulate obscenity law under the Constitution
and how the operation of individual state statutes pertains to the exercise of that
judicial standard. The best the Court could do was to state that “fundamental First
Amendment limitations on the powers of the States do not vary from community to
community, but this does not mean that there are, or should or can be, fixed,
26

Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 16 (1973).
Id. at 18.
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Id. at 29.
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uniform national standards of precisely what appeals to the ‘prurient interest’ or is
‘patently offensive.’”34 The Court blamed its inability to do this on the fact that the
“Nation is simply too big and too diverse for this Court to reasonably expect that
such standards could be articulated for all 50 States in a single formulation, even
assuming the prerequisite consensus exists.”35 Supposedly, under the Court’s view,
juries would be able to be the correct individuals to make this determination but
any attempt for jurors to look at any kind of “national ‘community standard’ would
be an exercise in futility.”36 By requiring a national standard, the Court said,
diversity of opinions throughout America would be “strangled by the absolutism of
imposed uniformity.”37
In addressing the second problem of obscenity, the Court (on the same day
it decided Miller) in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton reviewed a case that involved
two “adult” theaters in Atlanta, Georgia that depicted sexual conduct which, under
Georgia state law, designated the films as “hard core pornography.”38 The
Respondents claimed that they had protected this conduct from unwanted eyes by
putting signs on the theater doors that said “Adult Theatre—You must be 21 and
able to prove it. If viewing the nude body offends you, Please Do Not Enter.”39 The
Court held that the ruling should be vacated and remanded subject to Miller.40
The Court made “clear from the outset” that it did “not undertake to tell the
States what they must do, but rather to define the area in which they may chart their
own course in dealing with obscene material.”41 Acknowledging the State’s interest
in regulating obscene material, the Court listed “quality of life… the total
community environment, the tone of commerce in the great city centers, and,
possibly, the public safety itself” as some of the state interests that might be
implicated in regulating obscenity.42 In quoting a law review article, the Court
adopted the position of Professor Bickel, who argued that a person may do things
in private but that
“[i]f he demands a right to obtain the books and pictures he wants in the
market, and to foregather in public places—discreet, if you will, but
accessible to all—with others who share his tastes, then to grant him his

34

Id. at 30.
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Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. 49, 50 (1973).
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Id. at 52.
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Id. at 54-55.
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Id. at 58.
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right is to affect the world about the rest of us, and to impinge on other
privacies.”43
The Court went on to argue that neither the right to privacy nor the existence
of consent was enough to salvage the existence of the theater.44 This holding from
Paris Adult Theatre I shows that the Court continues to allow a person to indulge
in certain conduct within the privacy of the home, but that said individuals have no
right to obtain that content, however discreetly. The judicial act of turning a “blind
eye” to the personal possession of pornography while actively renouncing its public
consumption continues to be the controlling legal standard.
Moving forward from the dual decisions of Miller and Paris Adult Theatre
I, the Court decided several other cases that continued to develop and articulate the
area of obscenity, clarifying the role that community standards and juries played in
the application of the obscenity rules. In Hamling v. United States, the Court
affirmed that local community standards were dispositive in applying Miller as it
pertained to the application of 18 U.S.C.S. 1461, a federal statute that makes it a
crime to send obscene material through the U.S. mail.45 However, in Jenkins v.
Georgia, the Court noted that juries do not make their determinations pertaining to
community standards solely apart from the judge, instead holding that the jury
verdicts on obscenity were subject to judicial review to determine whether a jury’s
view of local standards is constitutionally aberrant.46 The Jenkins Court also noted
that state juries may be instructed to follow “community standards” without
specifying what community.47 Similarly, the Court in Smith v. United States stated
that although local community standards govern on prurient appeal and patent but
that a state statute cannot go below what is considered “patently offensive” in a
federal prosecution.48 Furthermore, in Pope v. Illinois, the Court relented its
approach to community standards as to the third prong of Miller and held that it is
to be governed by “whether a reasonable person would find such value in the
material taken as a whole.”49
After these developments in the law, now the community standards prong
of Miller only applies to the prurient interest and sexual depiction prongs of Miller,
but not to the whether the work as a whole has artistic, literary, political, or
scientific value. This complicated but necessary backdrop is essential for

43

Id. at 59.
See Id. at 63-69.
45
Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 106 (1974).
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understanding the more narrowed application of the Supreme Court’s holdings as
to obscenity in the context of child pornography.
C. Child Pornography, Ashcroft, and Community Standards
Building on this foundational jurisprudence of obscenity, the Court in New
York v. Ferber looked at whether a New York statute prohibiting the distribution
of material that promoted sexual performances by children under the age of sixteen
was constitutional.50 In defining what conduct was to be prohibited, the Court first
looked at whether the “conduct to be prohibited [was] adequately defined by the
applicable state law, as written or authoritatively construed,” requiring that the “the
state offense be limited to works that visually depict sexual conduct by children
below a specified age.”51 The Court then went on to clarify the legal status of child
pornography based on its precedent in Miller, holding that a “trier of fact need not
find that the material appeals to the prurient interest of the average person; it is not
required that sexual conduct portrayed be done so in a patently offensive manner;
and the material at issue need not be considered as a whole.”52 This means that the
State statute in question, must sufficiently describe a category of material that is
not entitled to First Amendment protection, but does not have to be considered
obscenity to do so.53 Content that is considered obscene under Miller would per se
meet this standard of having no First Amendment protection. However, Ferber
allowed for child pornography, regardless of whether it was obscene, to be
regulated under the applicable state law only if it described content that was so
lacking in value as to not be entitled to Constitutional protection, meaning that child
pornography that is not Constitutionally obscene could still be protected by the First
Amendment, if such content existed.
Crucially, the Court noted in its rationale that this type of content does not
exist within a veritable Constitutional vacuum, but that the “[d]istribution of
photographs and films depicting sexual activity by juveniles is intrinsically related
to the sexual abuse of children.”54 This means that there is judicial determination
that the harm pertaining to this type of action does not occur in the abstract, but is
instead an actual, tangible negative consequence of allowing child pornography to
be proliferated. Furthermore, the Court noted that “it may be appropriately
generalized that within the confines of the given classification, the evil to be
restricted so overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive interests, if any, at stake,

50

New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 749 (1982).
Id. at 764.
52
Id.
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Id. at 766.
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Id. at 759.
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that no process of case-by-case adjudication is required.”55 This essentially created
a per se rule that the vast majority of child pornography was always to be
considered obscene, as the balance of harm against the expressive interest would
always fall on the side of preventing the harm. However, that ruling would be
altered by the unique facts of the Supreme Court’s decision in Ashcroft v. The Free
Speech Coalition in 2002.56
In Ashcroft, the Court examined the Child Pornography Prevention Act
(CPPA), which expanded the definition of child pornography to include “any visual
depiction, including any photograph, film, video, picture, or computer or computergenerated image or picture” that “is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in
sexually explicit conduct.”57 The Supreme Court struck down the CPPA as it
pertained to virtual child pornography, holding that is not ‘intrinsically related’ to
the sexual abuse of children, as were the materials in Ferber.”58 The Court
essentially found a form of child pornography that was not obscene, noting its
holding in Ferber where it stated that “some works in this category might have
significant value but rel[y] on virtual images” which are “an alternative and
permissible means of expression.”59 The Court also affirmed that even is virtual
child pornography had the effect of encouraging pedophiles to engage in illegal
conduct, as the government contended, it could not ban it unless there was “a
significantly stronger, more direct connection” between the consumption of the
material and the conduct itself.60
Decided less than a month after Ashcroft v. The Free Speech Coalition, the
Supreme Court examined the problems associated with applying the local
community standards prong of Miller in Ashcroft v. ACLU.61 In that case, the Court
examined the Child Online Protection Act’s (COPA) use of the local community
standards prong to determine whether it was unconstitutional.62 The law restricted
the prohibited material to that which was harmful to minors, establishing this using
the Miller test.63 Although it did little to procedurally affect the case, the Court did
comment on the claims regarding the federal prosecutions of obscenity involving
the application of the local community standard. The majority opinion, written by
Justice Thomas, ultimately upheld the use of the local community standards prong
despite the introduction of the Internet allowing for a widespread dissemination of
55

Id. at 763-64.
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57
Id. at 241.
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Id. at 249.
59
Id. at 251.
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Id. at 253-54 (the statute at issue in this was later replaced by the “Prosecutorial Remedies and
Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today Act” (PROTECT Act)).
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Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002).
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Id. at 569-570.
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materials over the entire country, stating that a “publisher’s burden does not change
simply because it decides to distribute its material to every community in the
Nation” and that in every community where the content is sent “it is the publisher’s
responsibility to abide by that community’s standards.”64
Not all the Justices shared this view that the local community standards
prong of Miller should remain so unaffected by the advent of new technology. In
her separate opinion, Justice O’Connor noted that “this case still leaves open the
possibility that use of local community standards will cause problems for regulation
of obscenity on the Internet.”65 Justice Breyer specifically argued that “community”
should refer to “the Nation’s adult community taken as a whole, not to
geographically separate local areas.”66 He references legislative history that clearly
indicates the intention of Congress to make a national standard for COPA’s
application.67 Justice Kennedy, with whom Justices Souter and Ginsburg joined,
summarized the arguments supporting or attacking the use of a local community
standard, but stated that the Court “should not make that determination with so
many questions unanswered” and that the Court of Appeals should undertake a
comprehensive analysis on remand.68
After the Supreme Court allowed the litigation to continue in Ashcroft I, the
case came forward to the Justices again, this time in the form of a preliminary
injunction asking for the COPA to be enforced while awaiting trial. The Court
upheld the injunction on other grounds, primarily due to other infirmities in the
statute and not addressing the local community standards prong.69 Although the
Court has examined other statutes that pertain to this area, Ashcroft II marks the
last time the Court examined the local community standards prong of the Miller
test.
III.

DISCUSSION

A. Existing Law
1. Key Problems
Applying the local community standard to the remaining two prongs of
Miller falls short for a plethora of reasons. Firstly, the application of this standard
could so severely cripple the definition of obscenity as to altogether eliminate the
64

Id. at 583.
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Id. at 589 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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existence of obscenity in certain communities with a lower collective morality. For
example, in the ancient Greek and Roman world, it was common for men to have
sex with prepubescent boys for the stated purposes of building camaraderie between
troops and initiating boys into the military structure of the day.70 This extreme
example articulates the power that collective thought and isolated community can
have on the cultural establishment of morality. In our modern world, similar
locations exist where the local community standard would be applied in such an
intrinsically incorrect way as to not condemn that which would otherwise be
considered obscene. In Pahokee, Florida for example, there is an entire community
of registered child sex offenders that all live together to avoid being penalized by
the association restrictions of the law.71 Attempting to enforce a local community
standard of obscenity against a film like Cuties in Pahokee would be extremely
unlikely to be successful because the values of the community would likely not
condemn a film depicting children engaging in sexual acts of any kind.
Furthermore, its possible that other communities could widely condone the
expression of traditionally deplorable sexual orientations, as was urged by Mirjam
Heine in her widely disseminated TedTalk.72 In a controversial video, the German
medical student argued for accepting pedophilia as a recognized sexual
orientation.73 Though largely criticized by her peers, the video was still widely
posted and viewed thousands of times on social media and is illustrative of the
potential normalization of sexually deviant behaviors that could undermine the
application of a local community test for obscenity.
Secondly, the local community standard even within an average community
can vary for each jury selected. Unlike other areas of criminal law, where the
elements of the crime are either met or not, obscenity invites the jury to take a
snapshot of their community’s current moral compass and to apply that to the
circumstances before them. But that could change drastically within even a few
years, particularly if the age, population, demographics, or other metrics of the area
alter over time. To combat this, a jurisdiction could try to establish their own fixed
standard for what would qualify as obscene in their jurisdiction. But this attempt to
propose a specific standard is still generally not sufficient to pass Constitutional
muster.74 Thus, the local community standard lends itself to inconsistent
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Enid Bloch, Sex between Men and Boys in Classical Greece: Was It Education for Citizenship
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See American Booksellers Association v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, (7th Cir. 1985), aff’d mem.,
475 U.S. 2001 (1986) (Indianapolis ordinance was struck down as unconstitutional for
establishing a set definition of obscenity).
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application, continuing to suffer because of its unnecessary flexibility,
unaccountability, and amorphous use in each jurisdiction.
Finally, federal prosecutions are unnecessarily hamstrung by the inclusion
of a community standards prong to Miller. Congress has given the Department of
Justice authority to restrict the dissemination of obscene materials under a wide
variety of statutes. Federal law provides punishment for those persons who sell or
have the intent to sell “an obscene visual depiction” but only in jurisdictions limited
to land in control of the government.75 Other laws punish, inter alia, sending
obscene materials through the mail, disseminating obscene media through interstate
commerce, broadcasting obscene materials, or engaging in the business of
transmitting obscene materials.76 18 U.S.C.S. 1466A provides essentially the same
provisions as the previous seven statutes, while including information about
affirmative defenses and other relevant information.77 Congress also permitted
federal authorities to initiate forfeiture proceedings of said obscene items, and
specifically authorized punishment for the transmission of obscenity over cable or
subscription television service.78 These laws give the Department of Justice the
statutory authority to prosecute crimes including obscenity, particularly those over
a streaming service such as Netflix. The federal government has also authorized the
enforcement of laws that are designed to limit the exploitation and exposure of
children to sexually explicit content. These laws are broad and place a strong
responsibility upon parents to provide for their children’s wellbeing and protection
as well as a responsibility broadly upon society to avoid exploiting children through
the promulgation or creation of child pornography or other explicit material.79
While all these statutes grant broad authority to prosecute and punish crimes
of obscenity, child pornography, or other similar acts of indecency within the
United States and areas under its jurisdiction, each one faces a similar problem.
How would a federal judge or jury be able to accurately apply a local community
standard if the crime occurred within the broad jurisdiction of the federal
government? Or in a remote territory or region under government control that does
not have sufficient members to even form a community? For example, if a crime
occurred in a conservative rural part of a federal district but was heard in liberal
federal court in a metropolitan area, what “local community” would be able to apply
their collective morality? These questions and more are troubling and unnecessarily
restrict the efficient application of federal obscenity law throughout the United
States.
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2. Legal History
As articulated in Roth, the foundational principles of the Constitution were
that the freedom of speech existed to “assure unfettered interchange of ideas for
the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people” and that
“all ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance” are to have the
full guarantees under the First Amendment.80 The Roth Court wrote that the “door
barring federal and state intrusion into [free speech] cannot be left ajar; it must be
kept tightly closed and opened only the slightest crack necessary to prevent
encroachment upon more important interests.”81 Although the Court’s attempts to
protect free speech are at the core of its expression, the Court seems to have
moved away from an expression of the First Amendment that is in line with its
original purpose and instead is adopting an approach that is seeking to not limit
speech if at all possible, despite clear Congressional intent to do so, as illustrated
in many of the cases discussed above.
To the author’s knowledge, there is no Supreme Court precedent under
this Court’s obscenity jurisprudence (save for Ashcroft) where the conduct being
decried by statute was too invasive and overbroad so as to infringe upon
Constitutionally protected speech. Perhaps this is an indication that the “door” for
the government to infringe upon speech in this area may need to be opened
enough for the government to insert its foot. Otherwise, the pernicious vagrancies
of the world may be promulgated with the help of a Constitutional right that was
never meant to protect such freedom in the first place.
3. Biblical Principles
The Bible has a great deal to say about the joys of children in their
upbringing, development, and the treasure that they are to their parents. King
Solomon notes the innocence and impressionable nature of a child, stating that
parents are to “Train up a child in the way he should go; even when he is old he
will not depart from it.”82 The Psalmist notes the joy and preciousness of children,
stating that they “are a gift from the Lord; they are a reward from him” and that
“like arrows in the hand of a warrior, so are children born in one’s youth. Blessed
is the man whose quiver is full of them.”83 Parents are to glory in their children’s
success and growth, with the Scriptures recording that “I have no greater joy than
to hear that my children are walking in the truth.”84
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Corresponding, much like the foundational legal principle “where the law
provides a right, it must provide a remedy,” the Bible gives a strong warning
against those that would inhibit the growth and development of a child,
prescribing precise instructions for what actions must not be taken against
children. The Gospel notes that children’s access to salvation and the message of
hope through Jesus must not be inhibited. As Jesus said, “Let the little children
come to me, and do not hinder them, for the kingdom of heaven belongs to such
as these.”85 Parents who are entrusted with the responsibility of raising their
children must do so in a manner that is consistent with how the Lord loves his
children. Paul writes to the Ephesians that fathers should not provoke their
children to anger but are to “bring them up with the discipline and instruction that
comes from the Lord.”86 Similarly, he writes to the Colossians that fathers must
not embitter their children, or the children “will become discouraged.”87 The Lord
has strong words for those who would lead children into sin, noting in Matthew’s
gospel that “Whoever receives one such child in my name receives me, but
whoever causes one of these little ones who believe in me to sin, it would be
better for him to have a great millstone fastened around his neck and to be
drowned in the depth of the sea.”88
In the Old Testament, the Bible notes the deplorability of the twin cities of
Sodom and Gomorrah, specifically pointing out their fornication and sinfulness.
In the story of Lot, after angels visit him, the crowd comes to Lot’s home and
wants to have sexual relations with the men, to which Lot replies “Look, I have
two daughters who have never slept with a man. Let me bring them out to you,
and you can do what you like with them.”89 Lot attempted to give up his own
children’s virginity for a temporary comfort from an aggressive, perverted crowd
that was threatening his immediate safety. Consequently, Lot was only saved
because of his connection to Abraham, and the cities of Sodom and Gomorrah
were destroyed because there was less than ten righteous people there.90
The promulgation and proliferation of child pornography must not be
allowed to exist in a Nation that wants to glorify the Lord by protecting the
innocence of its children. Protecting the lives of children must be of paramount
importance to the church and the government, as both have a monumental interest
in preserving the next generation of leaders and citizens for the good of society.
Similarly, content that provides an opportunity to satisfy the desires of pedophiles
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and other individuals with a deviant interest must not be allowed to be safe
harbored under the protections of America’s great freedoms.
The Bible gives examples of governments that engaged in efforts to
remove evil from the land, including King Asa of Judah. In 2 Chronicles, the
prophet Azariah comes to King Asa and tells him that “The Lord is with you
while you are with him. If you seek him, he will be found by you, but if you
forsake him, he will forsake you.”91 These words motivated Asa to dedicate
himself and all the people of Judah back to the Lord and to remove sin from their
land. The passage goes on to note that a great multitude of people “entered into a
covenant to seek the LORD, the God of their fathers, with all their heart and with
all their soul but that whoever would not seek the Lord, the God of Israel, should
be put to death, whether young or old, man or woman.”92 The enforcement of
crimes was so thorough that even Asa’s own mother was removed from the palace
for having an Asherah pole.93 By giving a Biblical example of the governmental
enforcement of moral crimes, God provides a clear allowance and prescription of
this behavior for America to follow similarly today.
The Biblical admonitions emphasizing the importance and value of
children must not be overlooked when addressing this pivotal area of
Constitutional law. Additionally, the stories in the Bible that give examples of
children being mistreated or abused present a clear warning for society to
intervene when possible to protect the safety and wellbeing of children. The
freedoms of speech, the press, and expression exist for individuals to engage in
the marketplace of ideas that will shape and change our Nation as we continue in
this great experiment of democracy, not to shield the deplorable interests of a
depraved minority that seek to abuse and exploit the most delicate members of
American society. Based on this solid Biblical foundation and the existing
Supreme Court precedent, there is clear authorization for the civil authorities to
act in this area and a need to address the shortcomings of Miller and other
Supreme Court cases.
B. Proposal for Change
1. Solutions
In addressing the failings of the local community standards prong of
Miller, the solution to these problems is that of Justice Breyer in Ashcroft I: The
Court should eliminate the community standards prong of Miller and replace it
with an objective test that using a reasonable person standard.
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Firstly, the Supreme Court looks to objective reasoning for nearly every
other area of the law, as is discussed in more detail below. Secondly, the advent of
modern technology has obliterated the necessity of the community standards
prong of Miller, as the concurring opinions noted in Ashcroft I above. Finally, this
remedy has already been applied to one prong of Miller through Pope. By limiting
the application of community standards to the first two prongs of Miller and
including an objective reasonableness standard into the third prong, the Court has
already taken steps to remove the subjective language of the local community
standards test from Miller. There is no indication that public policy would not
permit the Court to similarly adjust the Miller test to have all three prongs be an
objective test, as the rationale of Ashcroft I centered on other issues with the
procedural posture of the case and did not find the local community standards
prong to be dispositive of the case, either for rejecting or approving its use. This
adjustment would be within the purview of the Court to do so and would be
consistent with the existing judicial trend regarding obscenity jurisprudence.
Additionally, to assist the uniform and expedient administration of child
pornography prosecutions by states and the federal government, the Court should
make all child pornography per se obscene under the Constitution so as to not rely
on state definitions to animate the application of obscenity prohibitions. Although
most state laws prohibiting the transfer or possession of child pornography are
sufficiently clear as to qualify as obscenity, a state could change the definition of
child pornography to give a particular media enough artistic protections as to
shield it from a constitutional challenge. In a situation involving a film like
Cuties, where the content has been lauded by many in the film industry as having
strong artistic value, it is possible that the film would not qualify as obscenity
under the local community standard, even if it was found to qualify as child
pornography. This issue is similar to the problem with using local community
standards for obscenity, meaning that all fifty states could have varying degrees of
what constitutions child pornography, but if it is not obscene as defined by state
law, then there is either a diminished ability or no authority at all to prosecute it.
Because the cross-section of media that could considered pornographic but
not obscene is a relatively small one, the enormity of this issue and the urgency
commensurate with addressing it should indubitably be secondary to that of the
community standards prong. Nevertheless, it behooves the Court to be aware of
the collateral effects that one area of its jurisprudence has on the other. Because of
the inextricable connection between obscenity and child pornography, these areas
should be addressed concurrently by the Court, with preference given to
establishing an objective test over the classification of child pornography as per se
obscene should there not be occasion to address both issues.
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2. Constitutional History
No other rights contained within the Bill of Rights or the Constitution
have been subject to a similar standard of community focus. For example, in the
Fourth Amendment context, law enforcement officers in many jurisdictions
inevitably will have different normative procedures for interacting with the
public. However, their actions under the Constitution have required thresholds
that they must meet, regardless of how community standards regarding
reasonableness may be in a particular part of this Nation.
The standards for the many provisions of the Fourth Amendment are
applied indicate that the Court is fully capable and willing to define objective
conduct for other areas of fundamental liberty. As it relates to the Fourth
Amendment, the Court has established that “the question is whether the officers'
actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances
confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.”94
Similarly, the Court in the landmark case of Terry v. Ohio has also noted that “it
is imperative that the facts be judged against an objective standard.”95
The Court has even applied a reasonableness standard to other aspects of
First Amendment litigation, such as in Ward v. Rock Against Racism where the
Court held that “the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time,
place, or manner of protected speech.”96 Miller’s rationale against the
establishment of a “national” community standard for obscenity simply does not
have a corollary provision in the rest of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. If
there is any apprehension for applying a national community standard in other
areas of Constitutional interpretation, then the Court does not admit those qualms
in any of its opinions. The pervasive application of a national, objective standard
of reasonableness throughout Constitutional interpretation is inapposite to a
localized test as advocated in the two prongs of Miller that still apply it. The
Court’s insistence on using a community-based standard is sui generis, does not
have an analog anywhere else in its wide breadth of Constitutional jurisprudence,
and therefore should be dismissed in favor of an objective analysis for all three
prongs of Miller.
3. Biblical Principles
As noted above, the Bible has a great deal to say regarding the protection
of children and the importance thereof. Laws that protect children from
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exploitation, abuse, or sexualization in popular media are near to the heart of God.
The Bible notes that the moral priorities of an individual will be made manifest by
their actions, noting that “Even a child makes himself known by his acts, by
whether his conduct is pure and upright.”97 Paul emphasizes the importance of
holistically caring for and providing for one’s family, noting that “if anyone does
not provide for his relatives, and especially for members of his household, he has
denied the faith and is worse than an unbeliever.”98 Christians must not only be
holding on the priority of children in their families, but also in society at large. It
is one thing for Christians in the church to say that they value the family, but it is
another entirely for them to take steps to change the law to reflect that reality.
As it relates to the establishment of a national rather than a community
standard, the Bible makes it clear that natural law exists upon the heart of every
human being and that there are moral realities that are written on each person’s
heart. See Romans 1:20; Ecclesiastes 3:11. The Apostle Paul notes
“…Gentiles, who do not have the law, by nature do what the law requires,
they are a law to themselves, even though they do not have the law. They
show that the work of the law is written on their hearts, while their
conscience also bears witness, and their conflicting thoughts accuse or
even excuse them.”99
The Old Testament is also replete with examples of an objective-based
application of national standards of morality. Beginning with the codified text of
the law under the Mosaic covenant, God made it clear that the standards for
morality would apply to all persons. Applying a national standard to the Supreme
Court’s obscenity test allows for the actions of sanctified and justified believers,
as well as those persons who are unsaved but still have natural law written upon
their hearts, to be able to overcome individual pockets of darkness and sin
throughout our nation. This appeal to an objective standard resonates with the
realities of how God has created each human being and will bring obscenity law
more in line with the principles of the Word of God.
IV.

Conclusion

In light of the clear Biblical admonitions regarding the protection of
children, as well as the examples of governmental action that wields the power of
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the sword against those who would promulgate sin in the land, this area of law is
one that has strong Biblical authority for its involvement. Additionally, natural
law is a universal standard of application, just as this law should be in its reach to
all citizens and sectors of the United States.
Regardless of the result of any prosecution against Cuties or similar forms
of media, examining the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence from Roth to Ashcroft I
demonstrates that this area of the law is complex, occasionally convoluted, and in
the case of the local community standards test, counterintuitive in its application
to the dissemination of media through the Internet and streaming services such as
Netflix. Obscenity jurisprudence must continue to work diligently to hold
steadfast to the principles of the First Amendment. Therefore, the local
community standards test should be removed from the Supreme Court’s obscenity
and child pornography jurisprudence and be replaced by a national standard.
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